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Abstract 
Agricultural producer participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for 
enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land. However, inducing participation 
in Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes for coordinating land management choices is challenging 
from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs associated with participation. This paper 
employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of such costs on participation and land use in 
the context of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) scheme. The AB creates a coordination game with multiple 
Nash equilibria related to alternative spatially-coordinated land use patterns. The experiment varies 
transaction costs between two levels (high and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating 
on the different equilibria. Additionally, an option to communicate is implemented between neighboring 
producers arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination. Results indicate a significant 
difference in participation and performance under high and low transaction costs, with lower uptake and 
performance when transaction costs are high. These effects are, however, impacted by transaction costs 
faced in the past. Communication improves both AB participation rates and performance with the effect 
being greater for participants facing high transaction costs.    
  
Keywords: Agglomeration Bonus, Payments for Ecosystem Services, Content Analysis, Coordination 
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1. Introduction 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) or agri-environmental schemes offer agricultural 
producers financial incentives for actions designed to increase the supply of ecosystem services from 
privately owned land (Hanley et al. 2012; Hanley and White 2014). In many instances, spatial 
coordination is a desirable feature of such schemes, enabling the delivery of greater ecosystem service 
benefits compared to a situation where the uptake of contracts is spatially uncoordinated. Examples 
include greater biodiversity conservation benefits on farmland (Merckx et al. 2009; Dallimer et al. 2010; 
Wätzold et al. 2010), successful species reintroduction programmes and meta-population management on 
private land where habitat corridors permit wildlife movements, or where certain minimum sized 
contiguous habitat is needed (Williams et al. 2005; Önal and Briers 2006), enhanced water quality 
improvements (Lane et al. 2004; Lane et al. 2006), and native vegetation restoration (Windle et al. 2009). 
Since participation in PES schemes is voluntary, economists have looked for tools to incentivize 
spatial coordination. One such option is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB), originally developed by 
Parkhurst et al. (2002). The AB is a two-part payment mechanism where producers receive compensation 
for participating/enrolling in a PES-type programme, plus a bonus if neighboring agricultural producers 
participate and select the same land use activity. In this format, the AB resembles a coordination game 
with multiple Nash equilibria pertaining to different land use choices. These Nash equilibria can be Pareto 
ranked by their payoffs. Laboratory experiments have indicated that such a payment structure can produce 
a range of desired spatial patterns of enrolled land parcels (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007; Warziniack et al. 
2007). However, Banerjee et al. (2012; 2014) found that spatial coordination is challenging, and the AB 
can often fail to produce the desired spatial patterns owing to coordination failure.  
Participation in any PES scheme incurs transaction costs for the producers (Shortle et al. 1998; 
Kampas and White 2004). Examples of such costs include producers’ travel time to meetings with 
government officials, the time and cognitive effort of determining the relative payoffs of signing or not 
signing a contract, and the costs of engaging farm and ranch advisors. Such transaction costs have been 
shown empirically to reduce participation in PES schemes (Falconer and Saunders 2002; McCann et al. 
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2005; Mettepenningen et al. 2009). The AB, with its more complex design, is likely to create additional 
transaction costs such as those associated with negotiating with neighbors. It seems likely then that the 
success of the AB will be influenced by the size of transaction costs relative to the payoffs of enrolling.  
Yet no analysis to date has studied the effects of variations in transactions costs on AB performance. 
Fooks et al. (2016) is perhaps closest to our study, in which the transaction costs are implicitly captured 
by a fixed submission fee. However, they study a conservation auction and not a subsidy scheme.  
Our paper poses two research questions. First, what is the degree of participation and spatial 
coordination realized in AB schemes under different levels of transaction costs? Second, to what extent 
can communication between neighboring producers improve AB performance given these transaction 
costs? We answer these questions using a laboratory experiment. Lab experiments are useful to this study 
because they bypass the fact that it is not practical, and often even impossible, to exogenously manipulate 
the size of transaction costs for PES scheme participation in the field; and because only a few PES 
schemes in practice today include payments for spatial coordination (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). By 
implementing a predefined fixed network structure in the laboratory, thus keeping the environmental 
complexity constant, the experiment allows us to specifically investigate how varying transaction costs 
impact  spatial coordination within an AB setting.     
Our experiment is comprised of groups of subjects who decide whether to participate in an AB 
scheme by paying a fixed fee – the transaction cost of participation. The transaction cost treatment is 
manipulated in a within-subject design. Since we are interested in strategic interactions and spatial 
coordination, we use a circular local network. On this type of network every individual is connected to 
two neighbors (to their left and to their right) directly whilst being indirectly connected to everyone else 
(Jackson 2010). While serving as a suitable framework reflecting the decision problems of land managers 
on real landscapes, this network structure also allows us to contribute to the experimental literature on 
equilibrium selection and individual behavior in network coordination games (Berninghaus et al. 2002; 
Cassar 2007). The network is also useful for implementing our between-subject costly communication 
treatment in a format representative of social interactions in agricultural communities where 
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communication incurs a transaction cost and is expected to be more frequent between geographical 
neighbors than with other community members.1  
 Our results indicate that transaction costs are a problem for participation only, with uptake being 
significantly lower when transactions costs are higher. Yet, conditional on participation, these costs don’t 
matter to the extent that there is no significant difference in rates of efficient spatial coordination under 
high and low transaction costs. The role of communication is not straightforward. Messaging 
unambiguously improves performance relative to no-communication situations when transaction costs are 
high (as it helps to resolve game strategic uncertainty). However, its efficacy in low transaction cost 
regimes depends upon whether subjects faced high costs in the past when participating in the AB scheme. 
 
2. The Strategic Environment 
There are 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 agricultural producers who face two simultaneous decision opportunities. 
The first decision entails whether or not to participate in the AB scheme. If a producer decides to 
participate, he or she can use their land for two different types of land uses, 𝜎( = 𝑋, 𝑌, which produce 
different levels and types of ecosystem services benefits. Our choice decision is thus at the extensive 
margin and different from the original setup proposed in Parkhurst and colleagues (2002, 2007) where 
subjects make an intensive margin choice of how many acres to enrol. We have made this distinction so 
that our results may prove insightful for understanding choices facing actual landowners in a PES scheme 
where enrolment options are “all or nothing”, such as in the Conservation Stewardship Program in the US 
under which the entire eligible acreage has to be enrolled in specific land uses to receive payments (NRCS 
2016).  
We assume that the ecosystem service benefits delivered from coordination of land use type X 
have greater agglomeration rewards than for type Y, and the regulator sets the AB payments to reflect this 
																																								 																				
1 In the field, transaction costs and costs of communication might vary with the degree of environmental complexity 
owing to individual and landscape heterogeneity (e.g., due to the amount and nature of land holdings, the number of 
landowners, or the extent of their social capital). However, the dynamics of these factors can make it difficult to 
isolate the treatment effects. Thus, we have controlled the transaction cost and communication cost to be the same 
for everyone, eliminating the possibility of confounding.  
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ranking. Such differences in environmental benefits from spatial coordination of enrolment might reflect 
differences in the ecological objectives of a scheme, or in the kinds of land use changes that are rewarded. 
Let 𝜎( =	NP denote non-participation for producer i whereby land is devoted to profit-based conventional 
agriculture, earning only agricultural returns.2 
The AB scheme consists of two payoff components. The base component is a participation 
subsidy, 𝑠 𝜎( , intended to compensate for any opportunity cost of conservation relative to profit-
maximising agricultural land use. Producer i receives an additional bonus,	𝑏 𝜎( , if a neighboring 
landowner implements the same conservation land use practice as them. Thus, the total bonus received is 
proportional to the number of neighbors choosing the same land use strategy, denoted by 𝑛(/. We assume 
that the environmental agency provides AB payments for adoption of pro-conservation land use of one 
type only, i.e., producers cannot choose both X and Y. We make this assumption because (i) PES schemes 
typically involve a menu of land use practices from which producers usually can select a few suitable 
ones, and (ii) paying some landowners for undertaking all listed actions may exhaust the limited PES 
budget (Cooper, Hart, and Baldock 2009; Armsworth et al. 2012), creating high participation clusters in 
some areas at the expense of low participation rates elsewhere.3 Let 𝑟 𝜎(  denote the agricultural revenue 
under land use 𝜎( = 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑁𝑃.  
If a producer i chooses to participate in the scheme he or she incurs transaction costs, 𝑇(. We 
assume that everyone has identical transaction costs, i.e., 𝑇( = 𝑇, which are either High or Low depending 
on the treatment.  In practice, these costs will vary substantially across producers and across land use 
strategies. However, by sacrificing some realism (which would probably not cause large behavioral 
differences) we gain tractability to identify causal treatment effects. The payoff, 𝑢( 𝜎( , of producer 𝑖 
under the AB scheme reads as follows: 
																																								 																				
2 Traditional agricultural land use practices (denoted by NP) can also deliver ecosystem services such as reduction in 
soil erosion and biodiversity benefits by providing nesting and foraging habitats. These benefits are, however, not 
additional as they are associated with business-as-usual land use practices. Since one of the criteria for receiving 
ecosystem services payments is additionality (Wunder 2007; Engel et al. 2008), such benefits should not be 
rewarded by the conservation agency. We therefore do not consider them in our model.  
3 Such localized clustering may be interpreted as geographical targeting of conservation funds which can be 
politically contentious to the extent that the U.S. Congress prohibited such targeting (Shortle et al., 2012). 
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𝑢( 𝜎( = 			𝑟 𝜎( + 𝑠 𝜎( + 𝑛(/𝑏 𝜎( − 𝑇					𝑖𝑓	𝜎( = 𝑋, 𝑌			𝑟(𝜎()																																																		𝑖𝑓	𝜎( = 	𝑁𝑃      (1) 
In Eq. (1) the number of neighbors and hence the bonus payment is contingent on the specific 
landscape structure. Following Banerjee et al. (2012, 2014), in this study we impose a simple circular 
network structure to represent neighborhood interactions. On such a circular local network 𝑛(/ can either 
take the value 0, 1 or 2. By employing a circular network each individual faces the same level of strategic 
uncertainty within the decision environment, since all have the same number of neighbors.4 Given this 
spatial symmetry in terms of network location, we avoid additional complications such as holdout 
problems due to bargaining power of some individuals who are strategically located. In networks 
featuring an asymmetric neighborhood structure (e.g., a two-dimensional lattice grid or a straight-line), 
individuals could respond differently to the transaction cost variation and information available through 
communication.  
We note here that while the choice of network structure is simpler than the more complex spatial 
grids implemented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2007), it still captures the main 
strategic interdependencies that are relevant for studying spatially contiguous land use. First, in many 
realistic environments, individuals typically do not interact with all individuals within their network 
directly but perhaps only interact with a few closely linked peers who provide them with information 
about what others within the same network are doing. Second, like more complex spatial grids, a circular 
network also exhibits strategic uncertainty regarding individuals’ decisions, especially if individuals have 
imperfect information about the choices of those who are not their direct neighbors (see Banerjee et al., 
2014). In that sense, while simple, our strategic setting is relevant to studying PES institutions. The 
payoff function specification in Eq. (1) makes the AB mechanism a coordination game with Nash 
equilibria pertaining to situations where individuals and their neighbors choose the same land use 
strategy.  
																																								 																				
4 Strategic uncertainty refers to uncertainty concerning the purposive behavior of players in an interactive decision 
situation, which arises due to the existence of multiple equilibria in a strategic game (Van Huyck et al. 1990 1991; 
Heinemann et al, 2009). 
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The AB coordination game has a Pareto efficient and multiple risk dominant Nash equilibrium 
strategies (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Parkhurst et al. 2002). Strategy X corresponds to the Pareto efficient 
strategy as it generates the highest payoffs (because it has the greatest environmental benefits and hence 
highest agglomeration bonus). Strategy Y on the other hand constitutes a situation of coordination failure 
explained by the presence of strategic uncertainty within the game environment. That is, it might be less 
risky for a subject to choose the land use practice Y as it corresponds to a lower payoff loss in the event 
that one or more neighbors choose not to coordinate on the efficient strategy X. Strategy NP is also an 
equilibrium strategy which does not involve participating in the AB scheme.  This coordination game is 
similar to critical mass coordination games where the payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a 
specific number of players also choose that action (Devetag 2003).  
In the context of the AB mechanism, Appendix B.I contains all parameters that have been used to 
construct the Payoff Tables 1a and 1b for the High (T = 40) and Low (T = 15) transaction cost treatments, 
respectively. The AB payments for X and Y are chosen to reflect the fact that ecosystem services 
generated through adoption of X land use are spatially contingent to a higher degree than those generated 
through Y. For example, X can correspond to land uses leading to a reduction of habitat fragmentation. 
Here, the location of adopted use matters much more than in the situation where land use involves 
reduction in fertilizer use where the number of adoptees may matter more than their location. The value of 
the high transactions cost is chosen such that the game has two Nash equilibria: 𝜎( = 𝑋	(∀𝑖)	and the 
outside option 𝜎( = 𝑁𝑃	(∀𝑖) with the former one Pareto dominating the latter. Choosing land use practice 
Y is not a Nash equilibrium because it is strictly dominated by NP. Therefore, if a subject chooses to pay 
the fee and participate in the scheme, he or she would be likely to choose X over Y. The high transaction 
cost thus eliminates the coordination problem in the event of participation. 
In fact, the high cost can also be interpreted as a form of signalling, credible costly 
communication or tacit-communication (Blume and Ortmann 2007), and combined with forward 
induction can reduce the strategic uncertainty associated with the presence of multiple Nash equilibria and 
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guide behavior towards the efficient X choice (Blume and Ortmann 2007).5 In contrast, for the low 
transaction cost setting, selection of Y by a landowner and both direct neighbors leads to a payoff which is 
not strictly dominated by the reservation payoff, yielding a third Nash equilibrium 𝜎( = 𝑌	 ∀𝑖 . This Nash 
equilibrium is risk dominant relative to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium 𝜎( = 𝑋	(∀𝑖). Although 
forward induction is no longer applicable in this setting, the low transaction cost can still serve as a 
cheaper form of costly communication reducing the underlying strategic uncertainty of the game and 
focusing subjects’ attention on the efficient X strategy. These conjectures are along the lines of theory 
presented by Hurkens (1996) in which the prospect of incurring a cost before game play can facilitate 
coordination on the efficient Nash equilibrium outcome. In our game the subjects have to incur the cost to 
move to the AB game stage, which may strengthen the ability of the transaction cost induced costly-
communication mechanism to generate participation and efficient coordination.  
Further, for the high transaction cost setting, T is greater than the participation payment for 
strategy X only. We chose this format because if the transaction cost is less than the participation 
components for both X and Y, participation is trivially incentivized even in the presence of the transaction 
cost and in the absence of the bonus. This is not an interesting case. The high cost T value is also not set 
to be greater than the participation payments for both strategies because this feature would further reduce 
landowner appeal to participate in the AB scheme. Under the low cost condition, the transaction cost 
value is less than the participation component for both X and Y to generate a situation where participation 
is individually rational. We did not set T to be greater than both the participation components for reasons 
similar to those for the high-cost environment. Finally, setting the low value of T to be greater than the 
participation component for any one of the strategies would have been interesting but we decided to 
consider a scenario where incentives to participate are enhanced since, in the high-cost setting, 
participation barriers are substantial. Given this setup, we have two hypotheses: 
 
																																								 																				
5 Forward induction involves making an inference about the future play in a subgame based on information about 
play leading up to the subgame (Van Huyck et al. 1993; Cooper et al. 1994; Cachon and Camerer 1996; Plott and 
Williamson 2000; Dufwenberg et al. 2016) 
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HYPOTHESIS I: (TC1) Participation levels are lower in the high transaction cost treatment compared to 
the low transaction cost treatment.  
 
HYPOTHESIS II: (TC2) Conditional upon choosing to participate, choice of the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium action is more frequent in the high transaction cost treatment compared to the low 
transaction cost treatment. 
 
Additionally, the individual’s land use choice, and hence the ability of the AB scheme to reach 
the efficient outcome and maximize ecosystem services benefits, is influenced by the degree of 
community-level communication and interactions. This is especially important in PES schemes where 
producers need to spatially coordinate their decisions (Lawley and Yang 2015). Communication can 
provide an opportunity to (i) announce and declare sustained commitment for a particular action, (ii) 
articulate reasons for having made a choice in the past as well as those which will guide future decisions, 
(iii) influence direct neighbors to choose the same strategy, and (iv) persuade direct neighbors to convince 
other social peers to make the same choice. More generally, in coordination games with strategic 
uncertainty, communication can reduce variation in game outcomes and promote the play of the efficient 
Nash equilibrium strategy by making it focal (Blume and Ortmann 2007). Thus, communication can lead 
to a higher program uptake, reduce or avoid coordination failure, and improve the ability of the AB 
scheme to generate the Pareto efficient outcome as has been presented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and 
Warziniack et al. (2007), and in more general settings by Charness (2000). Warziniack et al. (2007) also 
find that pre-play communication reinforces producers’ decisions to reach the Pareto efficient outcome 
quickly. Yet, in a conservation auction with AB payments, Fooks et al. (2016) find that communication 
may lead to collusion and higher rent extraction.6 Similarly, in more general designs the efficiency-
enhancing role of pre-play communication is weak (Clark et al. 2001).  
																																								 																				
6 Note that Parkhurst et al. (2002), Warziniack et al. (2007) and Fooks et al. (2016) focus on spatial targeting, i.e., 
how agglomeration bonuses – both with and without communication – can promote the establishment of pre-
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The impact of communication is thus predicated on the nature of the strategic environment, as has 
also been established by Duffy and Feltovich (2002).  Hence, it is important to study the role of 
communication on AB outcomes in settings such as the current one. Additionally, in all the previous AB 
studies, communication was assumed to be costless and introduced as an exogenous treatment variable. 
However, communication typically incurs costs; for example, the time spent calling or visiting neighbors. 
Given that transaction costs of AB participation are analogous to costly communication mechanisms, it is 
realistic that we incorporate explicit communication opportunities in a costly format into the decision 
environment.  Moreover in our model the presence of costly communication is interesting for the high 
transaction cost setting where there is no coordination problem post-participation and the only bottleneck 
is the participation hurdle.7 Yet, the messaging fee could also serve as an impediment because it increases 
the total costs of communication (when combined with the transaction costs of program participation). 
Thus, many subjects may not want to incur this additional fee and hence the benefits of communication 
may not be realized. Correspondingly, our third hypothesis is: 
 
HYPOTHESIS III (Communication): Communication opportunities between neighboring landowners 
leads to (a) higher participation levels, and (b) given participation, improves coordination on the Pareto 
efficient equilibrium.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures  
We report data from 24 sessions with 8 subjects per session, as summarized in Table 2, producing a data 
set with 192 subjects. Each experimental session was divided into two phases consisting of 15 periods 
each. In Phase I for 12 sessions termed HLTC (abbreviating High-Low Transaction Cost), subjects faced 
the high transaction cost of 40, followed by the low cost of 15 in Phase II. In the remaining 12 sessions 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
determined land use configurations across space. In this paper we do not investigate spatial targeting and concentrate 
on the general coordination problem of achieving the efficient land use on a given spatial network of producers. 
7 Note that we chose the value of the messaging fee such that the Nash equilibrium strategies under the two 
transaction cost conditions are the same in the no-communication and communication settings.   
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termed LHTC (abbreviating Low-High Transaction Cost), the cost ordering was reversed. We 
implemented this within-subject variation (i) because transaction costs associated with the same economic 
decision may change over time, (ii) to minimize within-subject variation for comparison across 
treatments, and (iii) to study behavior of inexperienced subjects and those with some prior experience 
with a transaction cost value. Non-binding pre-play communication, denoted by COMM, was 
implemented as a between-subject treatment in 8 of the 24 sessions.8 Subjects could communicate 
privately in chat windows with adjacent neighbors by paying a fee of 5 experimental francs per neighbor.9 
Subjects could receive messages from neighbors for free despite having chosen not to communicate. This 
communication protocol is similar to the one implemented in Cooper et al. (1989) and represents the 
reality that communication is almost always costly for the sender whereas receiving messages (an email, 
voicemail or written communication) incurs minimal cost.  
 At the beginning of the experiment, every subject received a randomly-assigned ID that 
determined their location and their networked neighbors’ identities. This ID remained the same in Phase I. 
We implemented this fixed-matching protocol because private land ownership and operation is usually 
unchanged for long time periods and also because repeated interactions with the same set of subjects can 
foster coordination by building subjects’ reputation for playing a particular strategy amongst their direct 
neighbors. At the beginning of Phase II the neighborhood structure was shuffled and every subject 
received a new ID and a new set of neighbors which remained unchanged henceforth. This ID switch was 
implemented to break any possible path dependence that is often present in coordination game 
experiments (Van Huyck et al. 1993; Romero 2015). This path dependence can confound the transaction 
cost variation treatment when transitioning from Phase I to Phase II. During each phase of the experiment, 
subjects received hand-outs (see Appendix B.II) containing information on the payoffs, the transaction 
																																								 																				
8	We also ran 4 sessions for both cost orderings (8 in total) where communication was free so that the costs of 
communication were essentially identical to the baseline sessions (termed NO-COMM) with tacit communication. 	
9 We kept chat windows open for 60 seconds to ensure that even if subjects chatted in all 30 periods, the experiment 
would not last for more than 90 minutes beyond which subject fatigue might compromise the quality of responses.			
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cost of participation associated with that phase (15 or 40), the reservation (non-participation) income 
(175), and a figure representing their positions on the network.  
In the COMM treatment, at the beginning of a period, subjects first decided whether they wanted 
to pay the fee to communicate with their neighbors. Those who chose not to pay the fee waited for others 
to finish chatting. After this stage, everyone made their participation decisions. In the NO-COMM 
sessions, everyone proceeded to the participation stage directly. In this stage each subject had to decide 
whether to participate in the AB scheme by incurring the transaction cost. Neighbors’ participation 
decisions were not revealed while subjects made this decision.10 Individuals who chose to participate 
moved on to the next stage in which they selected land use X or Y. Those who did not participate earned 
the reservation income.  
Once all subjects made choices they received information about their own and their direct 
neighbors’ communication decisions, participation, land use choices and payoffs for the current period. 
Additionally, an on-screen history table provided this information for all past periods within a phase. In 
the COMM sessions, this History table also included subjects’ own and neighbors’ current and past 
communication decisions, and the total fees paid to communicate. 
We used content analysis methodology to analyze all messages from the COMM sessions. Three 
undergraduate students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln reviewed chat content incorporated in 
195 different chat rooms representing both dialogues and monologues. Rather than classifying individual 
chat sentences separately, all messages within a chat room were encoded jointly and classified into 
different categories on the basis of a message classification scheme. The classification scheme was 
developed on the basis of review of two randomly drawn COMM sessions (one for each transaction cost 
ordering). The content of each chat room could be assigned to multiple categories. In order to minimize 
bias, the research assistants coded statements without being aware of the research questions and did not 
interact with each other during this exercise.  
																																								 																				
10 This approach allowed us to retain the simultaneous move feature of the coordination game although it comprised 
of two stages of decision-making.     
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Since the coding is subjective, we measured inter-rater agreement using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen 
1960; Krippendorff 2004). This is a scaled measure of agreement and takes a value of 0 when the 
agreement between coders is implied by random chance and 1 when the coders agree perfectly. Kappa 
values between 0.41 and 0.60 indicate that coders have Moderate agreement for that category, those 
between 0.61 and 0.8 indicate Substantial agreement and beyond that implies Almost Perfect agreement 
(Landis and Koch 1977). Table 3 presents a sub-set of categories from the message classification scheme 
which were coded with Moderate and higher reliability.11  
The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and subjects were recruited from 
the broad undergraduate Purdue University population using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) during August 2013 
and November 2014. All experiment instructions (included in Appendix B.III) were made available on 
subjects’ computer screens. We did not include any contextual terminology relevant to ecosystem services 
provision other than land use because we wanted to study how financial incentives impact experimental 
outcomes and also because pro-environmental terminology can potentially trigger various subject 
behaviors and confound the treatment effect (Cason and Raymond 2011).  
 Experiment instructions indicated that all subjects would be facing the same payoff table, that all 
AB scheme payoffs were net of the transaction costs of participation, and that the experiment would last 
for 30 periods.12 Before starting the experiment, subjects participated in a quiz to verify their 
understanding. The sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Subjects were paid a $6 show-up fee and 
additional money earned during the experiment. An exchange rate of US$1 for 250 experimental currency 
(francs) was used to convert earnings, and average subject earnings (including the show-up fee) were 
$26.82. 
 
  
																																								 																				
11We did consider other categories and sub-categories in our analysis, but they were coded with less than 
“Moderate” agreement and hence are not presented in the paper.	
12 To ensure that subjects knew that all payoffs were net of transaction costs, we clearly indicated their total payoff 
for each outcome in the experimental handout provided to them.  
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4. Experimental Results 
The results focus on the role of transaction costs and communication on (a) participation levels in 
the AB scheme, (b) the rates of efficient land use choice, and (c) the degree of spatial coordination on the 
efficient land use choice.13 In Section 4.1, we present the results related to the first two aspects followed 
by the findings pertaining to spatial coordination in Section 4.2.  
 
4.1. Participation and Efficient Land Use Choices 
Consider first the findings from the non-communication (NO-COMM) sessions. The top two 
panels of Figure 1 present the participation rates in the two 15-period phases for both the cost treatments 
pooled across the 16 NO-COMM sessions. Participation rates are always higher under low transaction 
costs in both Phases of the experiment. These rates fall steadily from 70% in Period 1 to 20% in Period 15 
in the HLTC-NO-COMM sessions. By contrast, subjects in LHTC-NO-COMM sessions are able to 
maintain relatively higher levels of participation with only a weak negative trend in Phase I. A non-
parametric Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test based on session-level average rates of participation in Phase I 
indicates a statistically significant treatment effect at the 5% level (p-value = 0.015).14 Thus, high 
transaction costs prove to be a deterrent for participation in the AB scheme, providing support for 
Hypothesis I. While this result is intuitive it is interesting to note that even if the high cost can generate 
forward induction tendencies (since conditional on participation, no coordination problem exists) and 
serve as a coordination mechanism, relative to low cost settings, it does not end up doing so. The weak 
negative trend for the low-cost setting indicates that transaction costs are less problematic at low values 
for AB scheme participation. Taken together these findings indicate that the effect of tacit communication 
																																								 																				
13 The Y land use (although not payoff efficient) is valuable for delivery of ecosystem services benefits, but is 
spatially explicit to a lesser degree in our model as reflected by the lower AB payment. However, our results focus 
on the participation and payoff efficient X choices because of the low frequency of Y choices in our experimental 
data (presented in Figure I in Appendix A), which makes it difficult to draw confident conclusions about Y land use 
for the current setting.  
14 All nonparametric tests reported in the paper employ independent 8-person groups as the unit of observation. 
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is weak in promoting participation in our local network AB setting, a finding similar to Clark et al. (2001) 
as mentioned previously.  
 
Result 1: High transaction costs can significantly reduce participation rates in the AB schemes. 
 
The falling rates of participation across repeated interactions under both cost conditions may be 
attributed to factors that resolve subjects’ strategic uncertainty (in favor of non-participation) and impact 
the likelihood of participation. First, unlike in a non-network coordination game, both direct and indirect 
neighbors influence payoffs but only past choices of direct neighbors are visible. The second factor is 
that, given the structure of the payoffs, participation and subsequent coordination on X is profitable only 
when both direct neighbors participate. This feature is true for both high and low transaction cost values, 
but losses induced by coordination failure are greater when costs are high.15  
The experiment’s two treatment phases are useful for evaluating how subjects’ prior experience 
with a particular transaction cost regime affects participation. After the cost treatment switchover, in the 
HLTC-NO-COMM treatment the participation rate jumps substantially from 20% in Period 15 to nearly 
86% in Period 16. This increase is statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-
value = 0.013). The corresponding change from 78% to 80% for the LHTC-NO-COMM group is not 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-value = 0.943). This result suggests a 
path dependence in outcomes for this treatment. Focusing on overall trends across all Phase II periods, we 
observe only a small decrease in participation in the HLTC-NO-COMM from 85% in Period 16 to 78% in 
Period 30. For the LHTC-NO-COMM treatment, a fall in program uptake occurs from 79% in Period 16 
to 36% in Period 30. However, no significant difference exists in participation rates between the HLTC-
																																								 																				
15 We adopted this feature to evaluate the performance of the AB scheme in an adverse payoff setting with the 
expectation that if the incentive scheme performs well in the current environment, it will perform even better in 
scenarios where efficient coordination is profitable even if only some neighbors choose X. Moreover, this adverse 
payoff situation also reflects recent reductions in PES scheme budgets overall, which require resources to be spread 
thinly over numerous existing programs (Claassen and Ribaudo 2016; Shortle et al. 2012).	
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NO-COMM and LHTC-NO-COMM groups in Phase II (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.14). 
To summarize: 
 
Result 2: Prior experience with low transaction costs reduces the negative impact of a transaction cost 
increase on future participation rates, moderating the effect of transaction costs as an obstacle for 
participation.  
 
 Figure I in Appendix A shows the percentage of X, Y and NP choices for both treatments for all 
periods. We observe 21% of Y choices when transaction costs are low and only 4% when costs are high in 
the NO-COMM groups. Thus, conditional on participation, most subjects select the efficient X strategy.16	
The top panel of Figure II in Appendix A displays the percentage of X choices conditional on 
participation for both phases for both cost treatments for the 16 NO-COMM sessions. Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney tests indicate no significant difference in the rate at which X is chosen between high and low cost 
costs groups in both Phases I (p-value = 0.461) and Phase II (p-value = 0.368). Accordingly, our data do 
not provide support for Hypothesis II. Thus, while the transaction cost a priori is a deterrent for 
participation (with the high cost creating a bigger hurdle than the low cost), it does not hinder the AB’s 
ability to incentivize efficient X choices by subjects who indeed participate. This result is true 
independent of subject experience.  
 Next consider participation rates and efficient land use choice X in the COMM sessions.  The two 
bottom panels of Figure 1 display participation rates for the 8 COMM sessions under the two transaction 
cost ordering treatments for all periods across both phases. No discernible time trend exists in any phase, 
and the participation is always greater than 70% and higher when transaction costs are lower (after few 
initial periods). For an understanding of these outcomes, we analyze the nature of communication.  
																																								 																				
16 Concerning the frequency of Y choices, Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests indicate a marginally significant 
transaction cost treatment effect (p-value = 0.052) in Phase I and at a 5% level of significance (p-value = 0.047) in 
the latter part of Phase II of the NO-COMM sessions (after Period 20).  
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Figure 2 presents information on chat frequency, indicating that despite adding to the total 
transaction costs incurred, subjects utilized communication opportunities under both cost conditions. Of 
the 195 chat rooms used, there is a predominance of dialogues (69 instances constituting 138 chat rooms) 
rather than monologues (57 chat rooms) under all conditions except in Phase I of the LHTC-COMM 
sessions. This is not surprising as dialogues are a more credible form of communication that can reduce 
strategic uncertainty and lead to more efficient outcomes, as has been found in two-player coordination 
games studied by Cooper et al. (1992).17 In the case of a monologue however the messaging player has no 
way of knowing if the receiver will respond appropriately. Blume (1998) notes here that, in games with 
costless one-way communication, in order for strategic uncertainty to be successfully resolved in favor of 
the efficient strategy, the sender’s message should be self-signaling to the receiver; i.e., the receiver 
should believe that the sender is being truthful about message content. Similarly for the sender, the 
message needs to be self-committing, in that knowing that there is a high chance that the receiver is going 
to believe the content of the message, the sender will follow through with what he or she communicated. 
The presence of the messaging fee in our study (and the high and low transaction costs incurred 
subsequently) potentially reinforces this self-committing and self-signaling behavior and thus elevates the 
credibility of messages conveyed through monologues, both for the senders and receivers.18   
Focusing on the timing of communication, Figure 3 indicates that most messaging occurs in the 
early periods of both Phase I (nearly 65% of all chat rooms) when subjects are unfamiliar or have low 
levels of experience in the experiment and early in Phase II (remaining 35%) when subjects are re-
assigned to new neighbors. Such behavior is to be expected given the costly messaging setting because 
once coordination on a particular strategy has been established most subjects would rather only pay the 
																																								 																				
17 A key point to consider here is that when subjects exchange messages with their neighbors on the local network, it 
is possible that they receive conflicting messages about which AB game action to choose. In this situation the power 
of communication to reduce strategic uncertainty and to lead to efficient coordination may be reduced (Blume 
1998). Yet the subsequent transaction cost stage (serving as a coordination mechanism) and fixed matching can help 
resolve problems with such conflicting messaging, increasing the likelihood of efficient coordination.  
18 Note that the findings in Blume (1998) are based on a restrictive message space, unlike in this paper where we 
allow rich communication. Blume’s theory is also based on randomized matching where there is a high chance that a 
large message space may lead to mis-coordination and coordination failure. In our study, fixed matching within a 
Phase, repeated interactions and learning builds reputation and familiarity in the game and reduces the chances of 
mis-coordination, despite a large message space.  
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transaction cost and rely on information feedback after every period to sustain participation and the 
efficient strategy choice.    
Turning to the communication content, Table 3 presents the Cohen’s Kappa values and the 
relative frequency of the different categories and sub-categories into which the messages were classified. 
The most common category coded is “Influence neighbors to choose Strategy X” (Category 4X) with a 
frequency of 44%; i.e., in 44% of the chat rooms, a subject tried to influence a neighbor to select strategy 
X by sending a message such as “Pick X and we all win big”. Moreover, across all COMM sessions we 
find that in 72 out of the 99 cases when subjects sent messages classified in this way, the neighbor 
receiving the communication selected X.  
The second most common category with an average frequency of 33% is “Discuss experimental 
game features and payoffs” (Category 10). This category mainly includes messages that explain the value 
of coordination on strategy X to neighbors such as “If you participate and choose X you will see a much 
larger payoff”. The category “Declare one’s commitment to select Strategy X” (Category 1X) is coded 
with an average frequency of 28% and is often combined with Category 4X as is evident from the 
statement “I’m going to choose A. it would do well if you did the same. We will garner the most money 
this way”. In fact 61 instances of X choices are observed in the periods in which players sent messages 
(through 65 chat rooms) conveying their commitment to strategy X. Such commitment is also predicated 
on past behavior. Of the subjects who communicated to neighbors that they were committed to X (in 44 
chat rooms), 32 had chosen X in the previous period.19 These findings support the self-signaling and self-
committing conjectures Blume (1998) makes about behavior in games with one-way communication.  
Finally, Category 8, denoting “Ask neighbors to influence their other neighbor's future strategy 
choice”, has a frequency of 18%. This category highlights the fact that subjects recognize the importance 
of the network structure in transmitting information about sustained participation and efficient 
coordination from one person to other in “stages” as presented in Chwe (2000). Thus, subject use 
																																								 																				
19 The number of chat rooms (44) is different from the total classified in Category 1X (65) because when assessing 
the relationship between messaging content and previous period behavior, we excluded 21 chat rooms for Period 1 
for which there is no past history and for Period 16 in which neighbor identity and cost treatment was changed.  
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messages such as “The entire room needs to choose X to maximize payout, begin choosing X and pass it 
on to your other neighbor” in 39 chat rooms.  
These frequently used categories represent the overarching goal of communication within this 
strategic setting – namely to reduce strategic uncertainty in favor of a strategy, to spread information 
about the benefits of choosing a particular strategy, and to generate sustained commitment for that 
strategy. The choice data confirm that communication is successful because relative to NO-COMM 
settings, very little time trend exists in participation rates (Figure 1 bottom panel) and a weak or no time 
trend exists for X choices conditional on participation (bottom panel of Figure II in Appendix A). Thus, in 
this setting, an explicit costly communication stage supplements tacit communication induced through the 
transaction cost stage in order for strategic uncertainty to be resolved in favor of the efficient outcome.  
It is to be noted that despite the obvious value of communication to promote coordination, 17 (out 
of 64) individuals across all COMM sessions never communicate. Many of these individuals have 
communicating neighbors who provide them with information about their upcoming actions and behavior 
in other parts of the network while the others (who have no communicating neighbors) rely on 
information feedback at the end of a period. An evaluation of actions of these individuals indicate that 
there are only 2 subjects who select Y in some periods and 2 more who choose non-participation more 
than strategy X. The remaining 15 subjects pick X in most periods. Thus, we can conjecture that most of 
these individuals rely on the high and low transaction cost payment as a form of tacit communication to 
resolve their own and neighbors’ strategic uncertainty in favor of participation and choice of the efficient 
strategy rather than incurring the messaging cost in the explicit communication stage.20  
To evaluate the impact of transaction costs on participation in the presence of communication 
opportunities, we analyze participation decisions using 2-way clustered logit regressions for both phases. 
																																								 																				
20 A key element of this paper is that endogenous communication possibilities cause different subjects to have 
different messaging profiles; that is, some never communicate, others communicate with both neighbors while the 
remaining communicate with only one neighbor in a period. This is interesting because the value of every message 
transmitted and subsequently its role in reducing strategic uncertainty needs to be evaluated in the context of all 
exchanged messages (Blume and Ortmann 2007). However, in our paper we do not analyze messages and subject 
behavior by communication profiles, as these profiles are not exogenously imposed. We thank an anonymous 
referee for suggesting this as an interesting topic for future research.  
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The dependent variable is the likelihood of participation in a period. The control variable is the dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 for the high cost sessions.21 The standard errors are clustered by subject and 
period (Cameron et al. 2012). The regression results are presented in Model (1) and Model (2) of Table 4 
and suggest no significant transaction cost treatment effect in Phase I and a negative and significant effect 
in Phase II at 1% significance level. This result provides partial support (in Phase II only) for Hypothesis 
I for the COMM treatment. Note that this result contrasts with the finding in the NO-COMM treatment, 
where the treatment effect is found in Phase I only.  
In the COMM treatment subjects use communication to encourage their neighbors to participate, 
to generate commitment for choosing the efficient strategy, and to ensure that the willingness to 
participate and the commitment to choose X is passed on to other parts of the local network through direct 
and indirect neighbor linkages. This implies that in Phase I communication allows groups to sustain a 
stable participation rate over repeated interactions even with high transaction costs. Combined with the 
fact that participation rates remain high and stable in the low cost groups, no treatment effect emerges in 
Phase I. In Phase II after the treatment switchover, participation rates remain near the level observed 
during Phase I in the LHTC-COMM groups. For the HLTC-COMM groups, nearly everyone participates 
in Phase II owing to improvement in cost conditions. This situation leads to a significant cost treatment 
effect in Phase II.  
Conditional on participation, 2-way clustered logit regression results indicate a significantly 
greater likelihood (at 1% level of significance) of X choices in high cost groups than in low cost groups in 
the presence of communication in Phase I. This provides support for Hypothesis II for the communication 
treatment and is contrary to the result obtained for NO-COMM. One possible explanation for this finding 
is that since subjects are already paying a high transaction cost, the extra communication fee if paid 
increases the value of the information received and focuses behavior of more subjects (senders and 
receivers) on choice X in the HLTC-COMM sessions than it does in the LHTC-COMM sessions where 
the losses from paying the transaction cost and the messaging fee are lower. 
																																								 																				
21 We do not control for learning effects since Figure 1 (bottom panel) does not indicate any trend in the data.	
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Considering differences in behavior driven by the communication treatment, relative to no 
communication we can draw two conclusions from Figure 1. First, the participation rate is on average 
higher with communication than without it under both transaction cost conditions.  Second, 
communication plays a more important role in the high transaction cost groups than in the low cost 
groups. Communication in high-cost groups averts the negative trend observed in the corresponding 
groups without communication in both phases, whereas in the low-cost groups behavior is relatively 
stable both with and without communication. For a statistical analysis of these claims, we employ 4 
clustered logit regressions (one for each Phase and transaction cost condition). The dependent variable is 
again the likelihood of participation, which is regressed on a dummy variable equal to 1 for the COMM 
sessions, the reciprocal of the Period variable to control for learning and capture the time trends, and an 
interaction term between these two variables to account for differences in learning rates between 
treatments. All standard errors are clustered by subject and period. Table 5 presents the results in Models 
(1) through (4). 
A positive and significant estimate (at the 1% level) is obtained for the  communication treatment 
dummy variable in both phase regressions for the high cost condition and for Phase II of the low cost 
condition, providing partial support for Hypothesis III(a). The positive estimate for the reciprocal of the 
period variable and the negative estimate for the interaction term for both phases of the high-cost 
treatment and for Phase I of the low-cost treatment indicates that game experience moderates the impact 
of communication on participation rates.  Taken together, relative to the NO-COMM setting, explicit 
communication although increasing the transaction costs paid has an unambiguously positive effect under 
unfavorable participation conditions. Prior experience with high costs improves outcomes under low cost 
conditions in Phase II suggesting that relative to NO-COMM settings, subjects are able to realize and 
upfront capitalize on communication opportunities when their participation circumstances improve. 
However since the messaging fee does not increase the total costs of communication by a large extent and 
also does not change the Nash equilibria of the AB game, without any previous exposure the low cost 
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groups in Phase I do not experience this improvement. These groups have to rely on repeated interactions 
to reap the benefits of communication.  To summarize: 
 
Result 3: Communication generates greater rates of participation in the AB scheme. Communication has 
a greater positive impact when compared to the no-communication setting in high-cost groups at all 
levels of subject experience than in low-cost groups.22   
 
4.2 Spatial Coordination 
This section presents an analysis of location-specific land use choices of all participants to assess 
the performance of the AB in creating spatially coordinated land use patterns. We develop a performance 
metric counting every instance where a subject and his/her two direct neighbors within their local 
neighborhood are able to locally coordinate on the same land use strategy. This metric can take a 
maximum value of 8, signifying that all 8 group members are perfectly or globally coordinated on either 
strategy X or Y. Any other lower non-zero value indicates only localized clustering of similar choices on 
the network. In this format, the same metric captures instances of both local and global coordination that 
are routinely observed in all groups during the experiment.  
Let us start by examining spatial coordination under the no-communication regime. The top two 
panels of Figure 4 present the average levels of localized coordination on X by a subject and both of their 
neighbors (termed locally efficient coordination) in the NO-COMM groups for all periods of Phases I and 
II. This outcome is of special interest for the high-cost condition since the non-participation strategy NP 
strictly dominates option Y. For these groups, post-participation, forward induction reasoning can guide 
many adjacent subjects’ choices to the Pareto efficient X equilibrium. While forward induction may not 
																																								 																				
22 In the sessions where messaging was free, observed participation and efficient choices were very near 100%. This 
outcome reiterates the observation that while communication does not eliminate any of the Nash equilibria of the 
game, the ability to send messages can make the efficient Nash equilibrium a focal point (thus reducing game 
strategic uncertainty) and can lead to greater rates of efficient play for both senders and receivers (Farrell 1987). In 
that sense the presence of the free communication and transaction cost induced tacit communication reinforces the 
focal nature of the efficient equilibrium leading to near perfect efficient coordination.  
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explain the many adjacent X choices in the low-cost groups, the transaction cost serves as a costly tacit-
communication mechanism and focuses multiple neighbors’ choices on X, which pays more than Y in the 
event of localized coordination.  
A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test detects a significant difference in efficient localized coordination 
between low and high-cost groups without communication (p-value = 0.05) in Phase I after Period 8. This 
finding is aligned with the results supporting Hypothesis I as discussed previously. Since participation is 
significantly lower in the HLTC-NO-COMM sessions, so is overall AB performance. A reason for any 
significant difference appearing only after Period 8 is that in the initial periods subjects are unfamiliar 
with the strategic environment, so most X choices are either non-adjacent or are by two neighbors (which 
is not recorded by the performance metric).   
With repeated interactions, participation rates fall in both groups, but they fall more steeply in the 
high-cost sessions (as an increasing number of subjects’ strategic uncertainty gets resolved in favor of 
NP) causing fewer neighbors to choose X. As a result, rates of localized efficient coordination fall to 
about 14% in Period 15 in HLTC-NO-COMM groups. Performance is maintained between 40% and 50% 
in the LHTC-NO-COMM groups, where more people choose X and the participation rate has a weak 
negative trend, leading to the significant treatment effect. In Phase II there is no significant difference 
across transaction cost treatments, consistent with the previous result regarding no significant difference 
in participation rates.  
Figure 5 presents the fraction of instances of globalized efficient coordination pooled across all 
NO-COMM sessions. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests indicate no significant cost-treatment effect in either 
Phase. Group-level coordination is difficult – for any value of the transaction cost, it is challenging to get 
all group members to make the same choices, especially given that information feedback is limited to 
direct neighbors. Yet positive rates of global coordination suggest that, despite participation challenges, 
the AB scheme can sometimes fully coordinate environmentally-beneficial choices.  
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Result 4: With no explicit communication opportunities, greater transaction costs reduce localized 
efficient coordination only for inexperienced groups. Globalized efficient coordination is not significantly 
impacted by variation in the transaction cost values.  
 
 Let us now compare rates of spatial coordination with communication. The bottom panel of 
Figure 4 shows the percentage of localized coordination in the COMM groups by transaction cost for both 
phases. A surprising result is that in Phase I, localized coordination is greater in the HLTC-COMM 
groups relative to the LHTC-COMM groups. This difference is marginally significant at the 10% level on 
the basis of a 2-way clustered logit regression (Table 4, Model (3)) where the dependent variable takes a 
value of one when players within a local neighborhood are able to coordinate on the efficient strategy X 
and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the high cost treatment dummy and the reciprocal of the 
period variable included to capture non-linear rates of learning. Thus, although in Phase I there is no 
support for Hypothesis I (as there is no difference in the number of individuals who participate under the 
two cost conditions with communication), more neighboring players participate in HLTC-COMM groups 
than in LHTC-COMM groups. Localized coordination is improved in low-cost groups in Phase II relative 
to high-cost groups since virtually every individual in the HLTC-COMM group participates (reinforcing 
the significant treatment effect supporting Hypothesis I) and nearly everyone chooses X. Model (4) in 
Table 4 shows that this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level on the basis of a 2-way 
clustered logit regression.23  
Finally, we compare localized coordination rates with and without communication.  Models (5) 
through (8) in Table 5 present the results of four 2-way clustered logit regressions (for each Phase and 
transaction cost condition). The dependent variable takes a value of one when players within a local 
neighborhood are able to coordinate and choose X. Similar to the previous models, the control variables 
include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the COMM sessions, the reciprocal of the period 
																																								 																				
23	2-way clustered logit regressions (with every group being the unit of observation) indicate no significant effect of 
transaction costs on likelihood of global efficient coordination in the presence of communication. 
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variable and an interaction term. Results indicate a significant (at the 1% level) and positive estimate for 
the COMM dummy variable in both phase regressions for the high transaction cost condition and for the 
low cost condition in Phase II, substantiating the information presented in Figure 4 when comparing 
across top and bottom panels for each cost condition and phase.  
Relative to the baseline settings where the high and low transaction costs present opportunities for 
tacit communication, explicit messaging can guide behavior of a greater number of adjacent individuals to 
the efficient choice, significantly improving the likelihood of localized efficient coordination. For groups 
facing low transaction costs, the COMM dummy variable is not significant in Phase I which is in line 
with Result 3. Moreover, the signs of the significant estimates for the interaction term and the reciprocal 
of the period variable for the high cost models indicate that with communication repeated interactions 
improves performance. Again, effect of communication in low cost groups is only obtained in Phase II, 
similar to Result 3. The regression results partially support Hypothesis III(b) and underscore the positive 
role of explicit communication  in promoting efficient Nash equilibrium selection in coordination games 
with both Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant Nash equilibria within a local network.  
 
Result 5: Explicit communication opportunities lead to significantly improved AB performance relative to 
baseline situations where communication is tacit. This effect is true for all levels of game experience 
when groups face high transaction costs. For low cost groups, the beneficial effect of communication is 
contingent on whether they faced high costs in the past.  
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5. Discussion 
 Our study results are of course predicated on the nature of the strategic environment, i.e., the 
payoff functions under either high or low transaction costs, the size and circular nature of the local 
network, and the degree of information feedback. A circular network does not describe many real world 
settings where an AB policy could be introduced. Using a spatial set-up different from the circular 
network (such as a line or lattice) may produce different results, since some individuals will have 
different numbers of neighbors, and will therefore face different levels of strategic uncertainty and 
payoffs. In the context of coordination games, Cassar (2007) finds that the frequency of payoff-dominant 
choices is higher in a “small world” or a “random” network than in a local network such as the one we 
consider. She also finds that coordination is obtained much faster in the small world setting, while noting 
that “a theory linking network characteristics to individual behavior is not yet available” (page 228). 
However, compared to networks where strategic uncertainty varies across players, we could argue that the 
circular network provides a lower bound on coordination failure in an AB setting. 
We could have chosen a transaction cost value less than 40, which would not have made Y strictly 
dominated by NP. We conjecture that this would lead to much greater participation and many more Y 
choices than is currently observed under the high-cost treatment. While this is interesting, this finding is 
similar to results obtained in Banerjee et al. (2014) and could have eliminated (i) any difference between 
high-cost and low-cost groups and (ii) subjects’ ability to use forward induction to guide their behavior in 
our network AB coordination game. Moreover, the transaction cost treatment is more interesting if it 
generates differences in the set of equilibria compared to when it just produces a difference in net payoffs. 
This leads to an interesting thought experiment: if a regulator wishes to increase participation or efficient 
localized coordination in an AB scheme for a given budget, is it better to spend this money on increasing 
the baseline (participation) subsidy, or on subsidizing the transactions costs that participants face (e.g. by 
providing free advice)? In our experiment, no real difference exists in the effects of these actions if the 
subsidy increase is equivalent for schemes X and Y, other than in the framing of the payments. But 
targeting the baseline subsidy increase at X only could increase the uptake of this land use relative to Y or 
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non-participation by more than an equivalent reduction in transactions costs. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to test whether significant differences in desired spatial coordination emerge from such re-
allocation of funds in the lab. 
 The size of the circular network and nature of information feedback may also impact behavior. 
More information and smaller group sizes usually generate greater rates of efficient choices in 
coordination games. However, with a group size of 8 we believe we have struck a reasonable middle 
ground whereby the group is small enough for many individuals to choose X and large enough for many 
to select NP or Y (owing to high strategic uncertainty). With this group size we are able to assess the 
extent to which the AB can still deliver on its environmental goal when the effect of each individual is 
relatively small compared to the total group. Finally, we could have provided information to subjects 
beyond their local neighborhoods (e.g., on their indirect neighbors such as in Banerjee et al., 2014). 
Although this would be inconsistent with our localized communication format, it provides an avenue for 
future research especially if regulatory agencies start publicly announcing enrollment rates in order to 
promote greater participation. It is also possible that coordination failure would have implications for 
what participants consider “fair”, and this could influence the likelihood of coordination on the Pareto-
superior equilibrium, especially if outcomes are observable such as in Reeson et al. (2011).  
 
6. Conclusions 
PES schemes are increasingly being implemented as policy mechanisms to enhance the supply of 
ecosystem services. The predominant property rights regime in countries such as the US, the UK, New 
Zealand and Australia requires that producers be financially compensated to encourage the supply of 
ecosystem services, rather than being compelled to do so by regulation: the “provider gets” principle 
(Hanley et al., 1998). Second, for many environmental outcomes, spatial coordination increases the size 
of environmental benefits for a given level of enrollment in voluntary conservation programs. The policy 
design challenge is to find systems of incentives that spatially coordinate a voluntary sign-up program. 
The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is one such mechanism. However, the AB faces a number of potential 
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problems, including the tendency over time for participants to converge on risk-dominant outcomes, a 
lack of cost-effectiveness, and, like many incentive programs, the size and nature of transaction costs. To 
date, the effects of transactions costs have not been investigated in the AB literature, despite their 
importance to PES scheme participation decisions.  
In this paper we use a laboratory experiment to investigate how private transaction costs affect 
the degree of participation in an AB scheme, its efficiency and the patterns of spatial coordination in the 
presence and absence of communication. We also show how these results are moderated by the 
availability of unstructured (and rich) communication opportunities with direct and indirect neighbors an 
issue not widely explored in the AB game literature. Results show that higher transaction costs lead to 
greater non-participation even though they have the potential to serve as a means of tacit communication 
to facilitate coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Lower transaction costs on the other hand are 
conducive to producing a greater degree of coordination on the most preferred environmental outcome 
even though they serve as a weaker form of tacit communication. Full coordination on the most efficient 
outcome is rarely achieved, but localized clusters of coordinated conservation actions emerge in most 
cases.  
Explicit communication is costly and adds to the transaction costs incurred, but it improves 
outcomes largely because it can reduce the strategic uncertainty associated with participation and 
coordination in the AB scheme. There are clear parallels here with experimental findings on the 
implications of communication (albeit costless) in “ambient” pollution tax schemes (Segerson, 1988), 
where the pollution tax liability of each firm depends on group behavior. For example, Suter et al. (2008) 
find that allowing participants to communicate in a non-binding fashion produces lower pollution levels 
and maximizes group profits. Our communication results can also be compared with the effects of 
costless communication in experiments on Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms for public goods, such as 
in Isaac and Walker (1988), where nonbinding group discussion significantly reduced free-riding 
behavior.  
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The policy implications of our results are clear: if the regulator can design an AB scheme in a 
way which keeps transaction costs low relative to the payoffs of coordination, then it will be easier to 
achieve spatial coordination (both locally and globally). This, in turn, enhances a more effective delivery 
of ecosystem services. However, if achieving a given environmental objective requires writing 
(complicated) rules for potential participants, then there is a trade-off between improving environmental 
effectiveness and increasing coordination, since such complications will increase transactions costs. Set 
against this scenario, facilitating low-cost communication between producers would improve the 
likelihood of successful coordination towards socially-desirable land use patterns. Providing subsidies to 
lower transaction costs during the initial phases of a PES program would also foster coordination, and our 
results suggest that improved performance could persist even after such subsidies are removed and 
transaction costs increase. 
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TABLES	
	
Table 1a: Payoff Table for High Transaction Cost condition 
Actions Chosen by Neighbors 
Your Action 
Both 
Participate 
Choose X 
Both 
Participate 
and one 
Chooses X & 
other Y 
Both 
Participate 
and Choose 
Y 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses X 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses Y 
No Neighbor 
Participates 
X 210 125 40 125 40 40 
Y 145 155 165 145 155 145 
NP (Non-
Participation) 175 175 175 175 175 175 
 
Table 1b: Payoff Table for Low Transaction Cost condition 
 
Actions Chosen by Neighbors 
Your Action 
Both 
Participate 
Choose X 
Both 
Participate 
& one 
Chooses X 
& other Y 
Both 
Participate 
& Choose 
Y 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses X 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses Y 
No 
Neighbor 
Participates 
X 235 150 65 150 65 65 
Y 170 180 190 170 180 170 
NP (Non-
Participation) 175 175 175 175 175 175 
 
Table 2: Summary of Experimental Design 
 Communication Treatment 
Transaction Cost Ordering Treatment No-Comm Comm 
High-Low HLTC-No-Comm  (8 sessions) 
HLTC-Comm  
(4 sessions) 
Low-High LHTC-No-Comm  (8 sessions) 
LHTC-Comm  
(4 sessions) 
36 
	
Table 3: Categories for coding messages (reaching at least Moderate Reliability) and observed 
frequency in chat rooms 
+ Only those categories (and sub-categories) reaching an agreement of Moderate or higher reliability are 
listed. X and Y labels correspond to Strategies A and B in the experiment.  
* Represents categories which have a relative frequency of coding of 15% or more. 
 
Category+ Description Cohen’s  Kappa 
Relative 
Frequency  
of Coding 
1 Declare one’s commitment to a particular strategy   1X Will select X 0.83 0.28* 
1Y Will select Y 0.90 0.03 
1NP Will select NP 0.75 0.06 
2 Explain own reason for choosing a strategy (X, Y or NP)   
2P In the past periods 0.45 0.02 
3 Inform one neighbor about other neighbor’s strategy choice   
3X Other neighbor chose X 0.45 0.03 
3Y Other neighbor chose Y 0.79 0.03 
3NP Other neighbor chose NP 0.69 0.04 
3NX Other neighbor did  not chose X 0.56 0.03 
4 Influence neighbor(s) to select a particular strategy   
4X Choose X 0.81 0.44* 
4Y Choose Y 0.78 0.02 
4NP Choose NP 0.79 0.01 
5 Ask neighbors about their future choices 0.55 0.07 
6 Ask neighbors about their reasons for choosing a strategy 0.65 0.03 
7 Ask neighbors about their other neighbors past choices 0.53 0.02 
8 Ask neighbors to influence their other neighbor's future strategy choice 0.88 0.18* 
8X Influence other neighbor to select X 0.89 0.17 
8Y Influence other neighbor to select Y 0.49 0.00 
9 Refer to own past strategy choice 0.49 0.01 
10 Discuss about experimental features & game payoffs 0.73 0.33* 
11 Agree on a strategy 0.55 0.13 
12 Other 0.54 0.34* 
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Table 4: 2-way Clustered Logit Regressions for Participation and Performance Analysis in each 
Phase for Communication Groups 
Dependent  
Variables Participation Localized Efficient Coordination 
Independent  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II 
High Transaction 
Cost 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.157** 
(0.032) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.106*** 
(0.023) 𝟏𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅C 
 
- - -1.343** (0.344) 
-0.756** 
(0.048) 
Constant 2.161** (0.612) 
7.43** 
(1.15) 
-0.098 
(0.478) 
1.975*** 
(0.49) 
Number of 
observations 960 (480 in each Phase) 
Cluster Variables Individual Subject and Experimental Period in a Phase 
** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level, * at the 10% level 
+ Period takes a value between 1 and 15 
 
Table 5: 2-way Clustered Logit Regressions for Performance comparison of Communication and 
No Communication Treatments by Phase and Transaction Cost# 
Independent 
Variables 
Participation Localized Efficient Coordination 
Model 1: 
Phase I 
(HC) 
Model 2: 
Phase II 
(LC) 
Model 3: 
Phase I 
(LC) 
Model 4: 
Phase II 
(HC) 
Model 5: 
Phase I 
(HC) 
Model 6: 
Phase II 
(LC) 
Model 7: 
Phase I 
(LC) 
Model 8: 
Phase II 
(HC) 
Comm 0.892*** (0.229) 
1.999*** 
(0.622) 
0.197 
( 0.245) 
0.782*** 
(0.246) 
1.063*** 
(0.221) 
2.019*** 
(0.374) 
0.028 
(0.192) 
0.864*** 
(0.237) 𝟏𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅C 2.197**  (0.871) 0.428 (0.421) 1.960*** ( 0.652) 2.674*** (0.902) 0.027 (0.458) -0.368 (0.227) -1.152*** (0.381) 0.610** (0.252) 𝟏𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅C	
x	
Comm	
-1.060** 
(-0.467) 
-1.094 
(0.81) 
-1.285*** 
(0.356) 
-
1.179*** 
(0.489) 
-0.848** 
(0.368) 
-0.375 
(0.658) 
0.078 
(0.327) 
-0.652*** 
(0.095) 
Constant -0.600** (0.29) 
1.579*** 
(0.251) 
1.549*** 
(0.29) 
-0.5* 
(0.26) 
-1.088*** 
(0.297) 
-0.086 
(0.728) 
0.171 
(0.449) 
-0.546** 
(0.245) 
Number of 
Observations 1440 
Cluster 
Variables Individual Subject and Experimental Period in a Phase 
# HC refers to High Transaction Cost and LC refers to Low Transaction Cost 
*** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level 
+ Period takes a value between 1 and 15 
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FIGURES	
 
Figure 1: Fraction of Participation in Phase I & Phase II of No-Comm and Comm Sessions by 
Transaction Costs Treatment 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of Monologues and Dialogues for Comm Sessions for both Phases and 
Transaction Costs 
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Figure 3: Fraction and Timing of Communication Channels opened with One or Both Neighbors by 
Phase and Transaction Cost 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fraction of Localized Efficient Coordination (player and direct neighbors choose X) in 
Phase I & Phase II of No-Comm and Comm Sessions by Transaction Costs Treatment 
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Figure 5: Perfect/Global Efficient Coordination (the whole group chooses X) in all treatments for 
both Phases 
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Appendix A 
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Appendix B.I: Parameters used to create Payoff tables 
Income from NP = 175 
Agricultural Income from choosing X: 60 
Agricultural Income from choosing Y: 80 
Participation Payment for choosing X: 20 
Participation Payment for choosing Y: 105 
Agglomeration Bonus Payment for choosing X: 85 
Agglomeration Bonus Payment for choosing Y: 10 
High Transaction Cost: 40 
Low Transaction Cost: 15 
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Appendix B.II: Experimental Handout for High Cost Treatment 
 
Circular Grid with Your Location   ID Number:   
 
Payoff from Non-Participation (NP): 175 
Cost of Participating in Land Management Program: 40 
Payoff Table 
Actions Chosen by Neighbors 
Your Action 
Both 
Participate 
Choose A 
Both 
Participate 
and one 
Chooses A 
& other B 
Both 
Participate 
and Choose 
B 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses A 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses B 
No Neighbor 
Participates 
A 210 125 40 125 40 40 
B 145 155 165 145 155 145 
NP (Non-
Participation) 175 175 175 175 175 175 
  All payoffs are net of participation costs 
You 
Your Left or  
Clockwise Neighbor 
Your Right OR Anti-clockwise  
Neighbor 
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Appendix B.III: Instructions for HLTC Sessions 
(Text in italics represents instructions for Comm Sessions. The X and Y strategies referred to in the 
paper correspond to the strategy labels A and B in the instructions) 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment 
 
Your unique Identification number - ID for this experiment is 1. This number is private and should not be 
shared with anyone. You will have this ID for the next 15 periods of the experiment.  
 
Please click "OK" when you are ready. 
 
General Information:  
 
This is an experiment in decision making. In today’s experiment you will participate in a group decision 
task. In addition to a $6 participation fee, you will be paid the money you accumulate from your choices 
which will be described to you in a moment. Upon the completion of the experiment, your earnings will 
be added up and you will be paid privately, in cash. The exact amount you will receive will be determined 
during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. From this point 
forward all units of account will be in experimental francs. At the end of the experiment, 
experimental francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 U.S. dollar for every 250 
experimental francs.  
 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to 
come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, and look at the computer screens of other participants 
during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the 
experiment and may not be paid. 
 
Please click "Continue" when you are ready. 
 
Today's Decision Making Task: 
 
The experiment will have thirty periods. In each period you will be in a group with 7 other participants. 
You and all the other players are arranged around a circle. The diagram of this circle is included in the 
handout that has been provided to you. The black dots on the circle represent your location. On this circle, 
you have two neighbors - a right or anti-clockwise neighbor and a left or clockwise neighbor. You will 
never know the identity of your neighbors. Your ID will determine who your neighbors are. Please keep 
in mind that every player has a different set of neighbors. Thus if you are Player 8 then your right or 
anti-clockwise neighbor is Player 7 and left or clockwise neighbor is Player 1.  Similarly Player 7 has 
you as their left or clockwise neighbor and Player 6 as their right or anti-clockwise neighbor. Your ID 
and your neighbors will be the same for the first 15 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of Period 
16, everyone will be provided with a different ID. As a result of this ID change, your neighbors between 
Periods 16 and 30 will be different from those between Periods 1 and 15. Also please remember that the 
person sitting at the computer terminal beside you is not your neighbor in the experiment. 
 
During this experiment each of you will assume the role of a landowner who can participate in a land 
management program or opt out of it. In both cases, you will receive money for your actions. You will 
first be given the option to participate in this program. If you choose not to participate, you will receive a 
payment. Participation is costly and so you have to incur a cost to do so. Once you have incurred the 
cost, you will be able to take part in a group decision task which is part of the land management program. 
In this task, you will make a choice between two types of land use actions denoted by A and B.  You will 
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receive a payment based on your choice of A or B. Since this is a group decision task, your payment will 
depend on the choices made by your neighbors as well. In a moment we will give you a detailed 
description of how your payment will be determined.   
 
Please note that you may decide to participate in the task but one or both of your neighbors may choose 
not to. Also while you decide to participate, you will not know what choices your neighbors' are making.   
 
Please raise your hand if there are any questions otherwise click "Continue". 
 
Your Payment from Group Decision Task:  
 
If you choose to participate in the land management program, then in each period of the experiment, the 
computer will display a table such as the one shown below. This Payoff Table will be the same for 
everyone during a period.  However the values in the cells will be different in different periods of 
the experiment. You will be provided with a handout containing the Payoff Table. Each number in the 
table corresponds to a payment (in experimental francs) resulting from a possible combination of your 
choice of A or B (in the row) and your neighbors' choices (in the column). Please note that all figures in 
the table are net of the participation cost, i.e., the participation cost has already been deducted from 
the payoffs. For example, suppose the participation cost is 40 and your payoff from choosing A and both 
your neighbors participating and choosing A is 250. Then your final payoff is (250 - 40) = 210. This is 
listed in the first cell of the first row of the Payoff Table. Similarly if you select B after participation and 
only one of your neighbors participates and chooses B, the payoff is 195. Then your final payoff is (195 - 
40) = 155. The last column in the table indicates your payoffs if you participate and none of your 
neighbors participate.  
 
Please note that when you will be asked to participate or not, you will know the value of the cost you have 
to incur. In general, your payoff from the group decision task increases when you choose the same action 
as your participating neighbors.  
 
Also your payoffs are the same if 1) one or both neighbors participate and choose a different strategy than 
you or 2) they don't participate at all. For example, the payment to you from choosing B and both of your 
neighbors choosing A is the same as you choosing B and none of your neighbors participating. 
 
Communication stage: 
 
Before making a choice in a period about participating in the land management program, you will have 
the option to communicate with one or both of your neighbors. For every person you choose to 
communicate with, you have to pay a fee of 5 experimental francs per person. Thus if you choose to 
communicate with both neighbors, you have to pay a fee of 10 francs. If you choose not to communicate, 
you don't have to pay the fee. Please note that it is possible that you pay the fee and choose to 
communicate with your neighbors but they choose not to pay the fee and communicate with you. If that is 
the case, you will be able to send messages to the neighbors with whom you have paid to chat and they 
will be able to view these messages. Similarly, you may have chosen not to chat with your neighbors 
but one or both of them paid a fee to chat with you. They will be able to send messages to you which 
you will be able to view.  
 
Your communication with the neighbor(s) will consist of messages exchanged in "chat boxes" to the left 
and/or right of your computer screen depending upon which neighbor you chat with. Messages sent in 
this chat will only be viewed by you and the neighbor you send it to. For example, if you are Player 8 and 
you and both your neighbors have paid the fee to communicate, the chat box on your left will contain 
messages you send to and receive from Player 1 and that to the right will contain messages you send to 
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and receive from Player 7. You will be able to send and receive chats for 60 seconds each period. In 
order to send a chat to your neighbors, please type in the blue panel at the bottom of your chat box and 
press Enter. To send a message to your left neighbor, type your chat in the left blue panel at the base of 
the left chat box. Similarly use the blue panel at the base of the right chat box to send chats to your right 
neighbor. 
 
Although the messages you send to each other will be recorded, your ID remains anonymous and hence 
all communication is anonymous to the experimenter and cannot be traced back to any subject. In 
sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) be civil to one another and do not use 
profanities, (2) only use your ID to identify yourself in any manner. After the chat period is over you 
will be able to see the chats you have exchanged with your neighbors for 10 seconds. After these 10 
seconds are over, everyone will make their participation and land management decisions. Please note 
that you do not learn the land management decisions of your neighbors while making your own 
decision.  
 
Making a choice in a period: (No-Comm) 
 
Once the period starts, each of you will first choose whether to participate or not. If you decide not to 
participate, then you will receive a fixed payoff. This payoff does not depend upon your neighbors' 
participation decisions. If you decide to participate, then in the next stage, you will choose strategy A or 
B by clicking on one of the buttons that will appear on the right of your screen. You may change your 
choice as often as you like, but once you click on OK your choice for that period is final.  
 
Note that when you are making a choice, you will not know what choices others are making. Also, 
remember that you will never know the identity of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are 
confidential and that no one will ever know what choices you make.  
 
At the end of each period after you have made your choices, your screen will display your choice and 
payoff. Information will also be provided about whether your neighbors participated and if they did, what 
were their choices for that period. Information on your accumulated payment through the current period 
will also be provided. At the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payments from all 
thirty periods converted to real dollars. This will be paid to you privately in cash.  
 
Before starting the experiment you will participate in a quiz on the next screen. Please note that you will 
not earn any money from participating in the quiz i.e. this is a non-paying period. Your answers in this 
quiz will not influence your final payoffs at the end of the experiment. 
 
Making a choice in a period: (Comm) 
 
Once the period starts and after you have made a decision to communicate (or not), each of you will first 
choose whether to participate or not. If you decide not to participate, then you will receive a fixed payoff. 
This payoff does not depend upon your neighbors' participation decisions. If you decide to participate, 
then in the next stage, you will choose strategy A or B by clicking on one of the buttons that will appear 
on the right of your screen. You may change your choice as often as you like, but once you click on OK 
your choice for that period is final.  
 
Note that when you are making a choice, you will not know what choices others are making. Also, 
remember that you will never know the identity of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are 
confidential and that no one will ever know what choices you make.  
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At the end of each period after you have made your choices, your screen will display your choice and 
payoff. Information will also be provided about whether your neighbors participated and if they did, what 
were their choices for that period. Information on your accumulated payment through the current period 
will also be provided. You will also receive information about your and your neighbors' communication 
decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payments from all thirty periods 
converted to real dollars. This will be paid to you privately in cash.  
 
Before starting the experiment you will participate in a quiz on the next screen. Please note that you will 
not earn any money from participating in the quiz i.e. this is a non-paying period. Your answers in this 
quiz will not influence your final payoffs at the end of the experiment. 
 
Quiz: 
 
1. Your neighbor has the same neighbors as you. FALSE 
2. Your ID and your neighbors change in Period 16 TRUE 
3. What is your payoff when you chose B and both of your neighbors participate and chose A? 145 
4. If you choose not to participate, then your neighbors' actions don't impact your payoff. TRUE 
5. When you are deciding whether to participate or not, you will know whether your neighbors are 
participating or not. FALSE 
6. If you decide to communicate with a neighbor, you have to pay a fee of 5. TRUE 
 
The Payoff Table: (Phase I) 
 
The table below represents the Payoff Table for Periods 1 to 15. If you choose to participate in the land 
management program, your payoffs will be determined on the basis of this table for the next 15 periods. 
This Payoff Table has been provided to you in the handout. You will be provided a handout with a 
different Payoff Table at the end of 15 periods.  
 
The cost of participating in the land management program for the first 15 periods is 40.  
 
If you choose not to participate, then you will receive a payoff of 175. This payoff is not dependent on the 
choices of your neighbors and is the same for all 30 periods.  
 
As mentioned before, all figures in the Payoff Table are net of the participation cost, i.e., the 
participation cost has already been deducted from the payoffs.  
 
Your ID for the next 15 periods is 1 and your left neighbor is Player 2 and right neighbor is Player 8.  
 
We are now ready to begin the experiment. You will be paid on the basis of all choices you make 
henceforth. If you don't have any further questions, please click OK to begin. 
 
Results Table: (No-Comm) 
 
On the next screen you will be able to see two tables. The first table presents your choice (of A, B or NP) 
and the choices of your right and left neighbors for the current period. Your choice is in the cell at the 
center of the table. Your neighbors' choices are recorded in cells on your left and right. NP denotes a non-
participation choice. The second table is the History Table and records your and your neighbors' choices 
and your profits for the current period and all periods of this experiment. Please raise your hand if there 
are any questions otherwise click "Continue". 
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Results Table: (Comm) 
 
On the next screen you will be able to see three tables. The first table records your and your neighbors' 
chat decisions for the current period. The second table presents your choice (of A, B or NP) and the 
choices of your right and left neighbors for the current period. Your choice is in the cell at the center of 
the table. Your neighbors' choices are recorded in cells on your left and right. NP denotes a non-
participation choice. The third table is the History Table and records your and your neighbors' choices 
and your profits for the current period and all periods of this experiment. Please raise your hand if there 
are any questions otherwise click "Continue". 
 
The Payoff Table: (Phase II) 
 
The table below represents the Payoff Table for Periods 16 to 30. If you choose to participate in the land 
management program, your payoffs will be determined on the basis of this table for the remaining 15 
periods. The handout containing this Payoff Table will now be distributed to you.   
 
The cost of participating in the land management program for the remaining 15 periods is 15.  
 
If you choose not to participate, then you will receive a payoff of 175. This payoff is not dependent on the 
choices of your neighbors and is as mentioned the same for all 30 periods.  
 
As mentioned before, all figures in the Payoff Table are net of the participation cost, i.e., the 
participation cost has already been deducted from the payoffs.  
 
Please remember that your new ID is 4 and your new neighbors are Player 5 and Player 3. Everyone else 
has a different ID as well. Thus your neighbors between Periods 16 and 30 are different from your 
neighbors between Periods 1 and 15. However your neighbors during the next 15 periods of the 
experiment will remain the same.   
 
Once you have received the handout, please click OK to continue. 
 
